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Richard Wyn Jones and Jac Larner
What progressives can learn from two decades of Welsh
devolution
The establishment in 1999 of what is now formally known as theSenedd, or Welsh parliament, was the culmination of a century andmore of argument in favour of what used to be known – more
pleasingly, we suggest – as ‘home rule’. While the intensity of agitation ebbed
and flowed over that extended period, one constant was that the arguments in
favour of devolution were almost exclusively associated with the progressive side
of politics. Not all progressives in Wales supported devolution, of course. Neil
Kinnock, for example, was probably the most effective opponent at the time of
the 1979 referendum, and his views do not appear to have shifted much in the
interim. But with remarkably few exceptions, advocates of home rule have
tended to be progressives who have all envisaged the establishment of a Welsh
parliament and government as a means to progressive political ends.
This, in turn, reflects the ways in which the particular trajectory of Welsh social
and political history has served to intertwine national and class narratives in
ways that have underpinned perhaps the longest period of progressive/centre-
left electoral dominance ever seen: a hundred and fifty years plus and counting.
Yet no matter how interesting the story of how we got here, given the umbilical
link between progressive values and Welsh devolution, now also seems like an
auspicious time to widen the optic and ask what lessons progressives outside
Wales might learn from the experience of the past two decades.
LEGITIMACY CAN BE BUILT…
The 1997 referendum that led to the establishment of democratic
devolution in Wales provided a night of rare political drama. Unlike the
Scottish vote that had been held a week before and which always felt like
the most certain of sure bets, the Welsh result hinged on the very final
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declaration of the night. That left Yes campaigners victorious but on the
basis of the tightest of margins: a majority in favour of only 6,721 votes, or
0.3% of the eligible electorate.1
“The 1997 referendum that led to the
establishment of democratic devolution in
Wales provided a night of rare political drama”
But while no one could reasonably have faulted the drama, it was, in truth,
an inauspicious basis on which to establish what was initially called the
‘National Assembly for Wales’. With turnout having only just edged over
the 50% mark, and with those who had voted divided almost equally,
Welsh devolution was a fundamental constitutional reform initiated on the
basis of the active support of only a quarter of the country’s electorate. Yet
so-called losers’ consent for the result was earned in relatively short order.2
In fact, when presented with a list of options in surveys, a plurality of the
Welsh electorate are consistently found to be in favour of more powers for
the Senedd (see Figure 1).
“Welsh devolution was a fundamental
constitutional reform initiated on the basis of
the active support of only a quarter of the
country’s electorate”
‘Earned’ is important here. The politicians who had worked together to
secure the referendum victory (a cross-party coalition consisting of parts of
Welsh Labour, Plaid Cymru and Welsh Liberal Democrats) were deeply
conscious of the fragility of the mandate they had won and worked
assiduously to buttress it – not least by seeking to build Wales’s devolved
institutions on a new, genuinely inclusive basis. Much has rightly been
made of: the efforts to use the opportunity of devolution to improve on the
country’s previously shamefully low levels of female representation; of the
stress on transparency; and of the way that the post-devolution political
process is far more accessible than that which preceded it.3 But it is also
1 Wyn Jones R and Trystan D (1999) ‘The 1997 Welsh referendum vote’, in Taylor B and
Thomson K (eds) Scotland and Wales: Nations again?, University of Wales Press: 65–93
2 See Scully R, Wyn Jones R and Trystan D (2004) ‘Turnout, participation and legitimacy in
post-devolution Wales’, British Journal of Political Science, 34(3): 519–537, doi:http://10.0.3.
249/S000712340400016X
3 Stirbu D, Larner JM and McAllister L (2018) ‘Gender representation in the “new” politics:
approaches to candidate selection in the UK’s legislatures and beyond’, in Cordero G and Coller
X (eds) Democratizing Candidate Selection: New methods, old receipts?, Palgrave Macmillan
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well to recall that it was the assembly’s semi-proportional electoral system
that offered the Welsh Conservatives a way back onto the political stage
after their electoral wipe-outs at both the 1997 and 2001 general elections.
While it is true to say that most Welsh Conservatives have never embraced
devolution with enthusiasm, and the party’s turn to populist Anglo-British
nationalism raises major questions for the future, to which we return
below, the enlightened efforts of Welsh home rulers to build legitimacy has
helped establish devolution – after the fact – as the ‘settled will’ of the
country’s electorate. Both the progressive lessons of this – as well as the
stark contrast with the way that Leavers conducted themselves after the
2016 Brexit referendum – should be obvious.
“the enlightened efforts of Welsh home rulers
to build legitimacy has helped establish
devolution – after the fact – as the ‘settled will’
of the country’s electorate”
… BUT THE WELSH MODEL IS NOT EASILY REPLICATED
For some on the English centre-left who yearn for a serious programme of
regional devolution within England, the Welsh experience, and in
Figure 1: Responses to a multiple-choice constitutional preference
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particular the journey from the overwhelming rejection of devolution in
1979, via the narrow 1997 victory, to today’s ‘settled will’, serves as a
promissory note that the disastrous defeat in the 2004 referendum on a
north-east assembly can also one day be reversed.
Hope springs eternal, of course. But it is also hard to see how the
conditions that made that Welsh journey possible can be replicated on any
regional basis within England. This because of the extent to which support
for devolution in Wales has been based on – and then built out from – the
existence of a strong sense of Welsh national identity.4
At some point in the mid to late 1980s, it would appear that support for
the principle of political devolution came to appear as a common-sense
corollary to feeling Welsh, this in a way that was simply not the case at the
time of the 1979 referendum. Unfortunately, a lack of data precludes the
possibility of explaining precisely when or even why this happened, though
it seems probable that it can be chalked up as yet another legacy of
Margaret Thatcher’s premiership. At any rate, it was on the basis of the
support of Welsh identifiers that devolution was won in 1997. While
support for the principle of devolution has widened considerably since
then, it nonetheless remains the case that it is this demographic that is
most strongly supportive of home rule, including further measures of
devolution up to and including independence (as Figure 2 shows).
This is not a source of legitimacy and support available to supporters of
English regional devolution – especially in the context of the continuing
(and in our view, politically disastrous) tendency of progressive supporters
of devolution in England to view the establishment of a regional level of
government as a prophylactic against assertions of English political identity.
In other words, the Welsh experience offers cold comfort to those
progressives who would continue to try to ignore Englishness.
“the Welsh experience offers cold comfort to
those progressives who would continue to try
to ignore Englishness”
4 Curtice J (1999) ‘Is Scotland a nation and Wales not? Why the two referendum results were so
different’, in Taylor B and Thomson K (eds) Scotland and Wales: Nations again?, University of
Wales Press: 119–147;
Wyn Jones R (2001) ‘On process, events and unintended consequences: national identity and
the politics of Welsh devolution’, Scottish Affairs, 37: 34–57
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Figure 2: Relationship between Welsh voters’ relative national identity and
their constitutional preferences (on a 0–10 scale)
Source: Welsh Election Study 2019
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE AND COHERENCE MATTERS –
ESPECIALLY FOR PROGRESSIVES
The paradox of Welsh devolution is that support for the principle of
devolution has widened and deepened across the country’s population,
even if the history of constitution-building over the past two decades is best
characterised as a series of failures.
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a full account of this
sorry tale. Suffice it to say that the original model of executive devolution
was so hopelessly inadequate that devolved politicians of all stripes colluded
together to try to carve out something more workable from the incoherent
mess that was the Government of Wales Act 1998.5 That was succeeded by
a new Government of Wales Act in 2006, which incorporated within itself
two different schemes by which the assembly could create primary
legislation. The first – operational between 2007 and 2011 – was a scheme
5 See Rawlings R (2003) Delineating Wales: Constitutional, legal and administrative aspects of
national devolution, University of Wales Press
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of such byzantine complexity that it rapidly lost all credibility. It was
replaced by a so-called conferred powers model of legislative devolution.
This was similar to the one originally proposed for Scotland in the late
1970s but which the UK government had subsequently rejected when
Scottish devolution returned onto the agenda in the late 1990s on the basis
that it would not provide the requisite level of legal certainty about the
powers and competences of the new devolved parliament. And lo and
behold, when it was enacted in Wales in 2011, it led almost immediately
to Supreme Court challenges and the kinds of uncertainties about which
policymakers had already been forewarned.
Since then, there have been two further fundamental changes to the
devolution dispensation – the term ‘settlement’ seems singularly
inappropriate. The Wales Act 2014 led to the creation of devolved
taxes, including the ‘Welsh variable rate’ of income tax. The manifest
failings of the conferred powers model then led to the passage of the
Wales Act 2017, which moved Welsh devolution on to a reserved
powers model of legislative devolution, similar to that found in Scotland
and Northern Ireland. Yet despite this, Wales still remains out of step
inasmuch as justice functions remain un-devolved, leaving the Welsh
government unable to engage in any meaningful way with the fact that
Wales has consistently the highest imprisonment rate in western
Europe.6
And herein lies the rub. While the story of constitutional instability
provides plenty of fodder for academic seminars and the like, in terms of
progressive policymaking it can only be considered as an opportunity lost.
Time and time again, when attempts have been made to develop new
policy initiatives, they have run up against the limits of the Senedd’s
legislative competences. This was perhaps most pronounced in the first
years of devolution, but it remains the case even today when devolved
powers have been substantially expanded. Then of course there’s the
opportunity cost of having had to devote so much time and energy to
process rather than actual substance.
6 Jones R (2020) Prison, Probation and Sentencing in Wales: 2019 factfile, Wales Governance
Centre
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“While the story of constitutional instability
provides plenty of fodder for academic
seminars and the like, in terms of progressive
policymaking it can only be considered as an
opportunity lost”
In turn, this helps explains why, in policy terms, the story of Welsh
devolution so far is – whisper it quietly – pretty unimpressive. Bus passes
for older people; free prescriptions for all; and a system of higher education
funding that’s generous to students but has left universities themselves
struggling. While these are the examples of positive changes that tend be
seized upon by supporters of the Welsh government, over a period of two
decades they amount to thin gruel.
More significant, in truth, has been the ability of devolved institutions to
block disastrous initiatives being pursued by successive UK governments in
England. The Private Finance Inititative (PFI), the evisceration of local
government, marketisation even in settings where this is manifestly
inappropriate – these are only some of the developments that have been
(largely) seen off in Wales. From a progressive perspective, this is welcome.
But the real lesson is surely that piecemeal, incoherent efforts to
decentralise power that ignore basic constitutional principles – that is,
overwhelmingly the kind of ‘devolution’ we have seen in England over the
past two decades – leads largely to an essentially defensive approach to
policymaking and, beyond that, frustration and stasis. In Wales, devolution
has been able to rely on the staunch support of a significant proportion of
the Welsh population in order to gradually transcend these limitations.
English devolution, however, remains stuck in the constitutional mire.
“English devolution, however, remains stuck
in the constitutional mire.”
PROGRESSIVES REMAIN SLOW TO ENGAGE WITH THE
TRANSFORMATIONAL POSSIBILITIES OF DEVOLUTION
Given that Wales has a stable centre-left majority in its devolved
parliament and has been governed by the centre-left since 1999, one of the
more puzzling features of the past two decades is why progressive think
tanks and other policy entrepreneurs have not made more of an effort to
persuade Wales to act as a test bed for progressive policy ideas. So, for
example, there is no Welsh equivalent of IPPR Scotland or IPPR North,
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neither have the trade unions invested in creating serious policymaking
capacity in Wales. There are almost certainly contingent explanations for
some of this. In the early years, the difficulties of doing anything
constructive within the confines of the executive devolution could well
have acted as a disincentive. It probably hasn’t helped either that the
major expansion in powers and competences at the Welsh level has
coincided with austerity, with less money available to fund such
developments. Or perhaps Welsh Labour isn’t regarded as welcoming
such initiatives and Plaid Cymru – the other main player on the centre-
left – is regarded as being beyond the pale? There’s also the possibility
that Wales just isn’t seen as being significant enough to justify the
investment.
All this is speculation. What seems beyond doubt is that this lack of
engagement by progressive policy thinkers must be regarded as another
opportunity lost – especially in a context in which progressives are
increasingly focused on the transformational potential of policies devised
and enacted at the regional or ‘meso’ level. Wales provides a largely
untapped yet, we might suggest, unrivalled opportunity to put such theory
into practice. Time will tell if this will change or if Wales will continue to
be left to its own devices.
THE FIRST TWO DECADES WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY THE
EASY BIT
Wales’s devolved institutions have managed the difficult task of
transitioning from bodies with minimal powers and limited public
support to being powerful actors in Welsh life, enjoying widespread
support and legitimacy. The current COVID-19 pandemic is serving
only to underline the extent to which Wales has changed in only two
decades, with the Welsh government’s cautious and measured approach
winning widespread plaudits and support right across the political
spectrum, with the exception of the populist right (though note that even
this fissiparous grouping has now split into pro- and anti-devolution
factions).
Yet it also seems reasonable to suggest that the challenges facing Welsh
devolution are likely to be even more daunting over the coming years. The
country is now faced with a UK government that is using Brexit as an
opportunity to centralise power. Indeed, through its Internal Market Bill, it
is now actively undermining the foundations on which devolution has been
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built – all this without any clear or coherent idea of what new order might
take its place.7 Since the coming to power of the Johnson–Cummings
duumvirate, the Welsh government’s attempts to engage constructively
with the UK government have been comprehensively rebuffed, and all its
warnings about the likely consequences of doing so for the very fabric and
future of the Union ignored. Meanwhile, the Welsh Conservatives have
not only become increasingly strident in their support for anything and
everything that the UK government does but also would seem to be
adopting a position whose logical conclusion can only be the unwinding of
devolution.
“Since the coming to power of the Johnson–
Cummings duumvirate, the Welsh
government’s attempts to engage
constructively with the UK government have
been comprehensively rebuffed”
The entirely predictable consequence of this is to push many in Wales in
the direction of independence. The rapid growth in support for
independence is underlined by the fact that the most recent polling shows
that around half of Welsh Labour’s supporters at the December 2019
general election – overwhelmingly its younger and more progressive
supporters – would vote Yes if a referendum were to be called.8
It remains to be seen if progressives who want to preserve the Union will
be able to present an alternative vision for the future of the Union beyond
warm and, so far, contentless words about ‘federalism’. Equally significant
is their ability to present a credible plan for realising that vision. But there
should be no doubt that if forced to choose between a centralising UK
state hell-bent on lowering social and environmental standards in the name
of ‘Global Britain’, or pursuing the dream of a fairer, greener Wales, many
progressives of different political stripes will opt for the latter, no matter
the practical obstacles. In Wales, support for home rule and progressive
values continue to walk hand in hand.
7 See Dougan M, Hayward K, Hunt J, McEwan N, McHarg A and Wincott D (2020) UK Inter-
nal Market Bill, Devolution and the Union, UK in a Changing Europe
8 YesCymru (2020) ‘A third would vote for Welsh independence tomorrow’, YesCymru website,
25 August 2020. https://www.yes.cymru/third_vote_independence
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